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1963] RECENT DECISIONS 135 
PATENTS-ADJUDICATION OF VALIDITY IN INFRINGEl\IENT CASES WHERE 
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL EXIST-Petitioner's complaint alleg-
ing validity and infringement of his patent was dismissed by the trial court 
on the ground that petitioner had granted to respondent an implied license 
or "shop right." On appeal, petitioner claimed, among other things, error 
in the refusal of the trial court to rule on the questions of validity and 
infringement of the patent. Respondent moved to strike these claims 
from petitioner's statement of points on appeal. Held, motion denied. 
Failure of the trial court to pass on the questions of validity and infringe-
ment does not preclude the petitioner from arguing these issues on 
appeal. Kierulff v . .Metropolitan Stevedore Co., 300 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 
1962). 
The motion in the principal case raises the question of whether a trial 
court, in a patent infringement suit, should be required to rule on the 
validity of a patent when adequate grounds, other than invalidity, exist 
for dismissal of the suit (e.g., non-infringement, shop right, implied license). 
Initially, the judiciary adopted the "esprit de patentability" approach 
toward infringement suits, avoiding the question of validity of a patent 
when alternative grounds for dismissal could be found.1 The courts 
felt that an inquiry into the validity of a patent would be superfluous to 
disposal of the case, serving only as an unjustified advisory opinion.2 As a 
result, dismissal of an infringement suit judicially reinforced "the presump-
tion of validity arising from the fact of the grant."3 Judge Jerome Frank, 
in a concurring opinion, first attacked the "esprit de patentability" 
approach, stating that the courts had a duty to protect the "paramount 
public interest" by invalidating defective patents which are brought to 
light in infringement suits.4 This particular view came near to attaining 
Supreme Court approval in Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp.,5 
where Mr. Justice Jackson stated: "It has come to be recognized ... that 
of the two questions [validity and infringement], validity has the greater 
... importance ... and the District Court in this case followed what will 
usually be the better practice by inquiring fully into the validity of this 
patent."6 This "better practice" standard has been interpreted by a small 
g1·oup of jurists as a peremptory directive to the trial courts to examine 
1 See Armstrong Cork Co. v. United Cork Cos., 107 F.2d 36, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1939); 
\\'oodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative 
Law, 55 HARV. L. REv. 950, 957 (19-12). 
2 See, e.g., Franklin v. Masonite Corp., 132 F.2d 800, 801 (2d Cir. 1942); National 
Nut Co. v. Sontag Chain Stores Co., 107 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1939), rev'd on other 
grounds, 310 U.S. 281 (1940); Krasnow v. Sacks &: Perry, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 828, 829 
(.S.D.N.Y. 1945); S. R. Leon, Inc. v. Parfums Schiaparelli, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 
1940). 
8 Infa v. Buick Motor Co., 88 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 702 
(1937); accord, Penmac Corp. v. Esterbrook Steel Pen Mfg. Co., 108 F.2d 695, 697 (2d 
Cir. 1940). Under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1958), "a patent shall be presumed valid." 
4 Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1942). 
5 325 U .s. 327 (1945). 
G Id. at 330. (Emphasis added.) 
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the validity of a patent before proceeding to the question of infringement.7 
At the other extreme, several lower court decisions have failed to give any 
recognition to the "better practice" standard, evidently viewing it as an 
insignificant dictum, and have in essence followed the "esprit de patent-
ability" approach of the pre-Sinclair period.8 An intermediate position 
has also evolved, interpreting the "better practice" language as a grant 
of procedural discretion to courts deciding infringement suits.0 According 
to this last view, the "better practice" is a permissive rather than a manda-
tory standard,10 serving as a word of caution to the trial courts to examine 
the validity of the patent if it is convenient under the circumstances 
of the case.11 
The reasons for the diverse interpretations of the "better practice" 
standard can best be understood through an examination of the policies 
underlying each view. The peremptory-directive decisions emphasize that 
this procedure results first in a better protection of the paramount public 
interest in the patent system, and second, in a conservation of judicial 
energy and expense. The argument based on public interest in the patent 
system implies that invalid grants of patents are not uncommon,12 and that 
since the government is limited in its ability to contest these grants,13 the 
judiciary should do so. Through judicial action, "scarecrows" and more 
subtle forms of invalid patents would be removed. This would encourage 
not only inventions, but increased manufacturing activity and trade on 
the part of individuals and companies previously dissuaded by an illusion 
that the patentee had a valid monopoly. The conservation of judicial 
energy argument for a mandatory examination of the validity question 
stresses the removal of costly repetition from the judicial process. A patent 
must be found to be valid before a judgment of infringement can be 
7 See, e.g., Helbush v. Finkle, 170 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1948); Measurements Corp. v. 
F'erris Instrument Corp., 159 F.2d 590, 592 (3d Cir. 1947); Pennington Eng'r Co. v. 
Spicer Mfg. Corp., 165 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir. 1947); Sunlite Mfg. Co. v. Clarvan Corp., 
73 F. Supp. 938, 941 (E.D. Wis. 1947). 
8 See, e.g., Crowson v. Dennington, 141 F. Supp. 647, 650 (W.D. Ark. 1956); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 91 F. Supp. 218, 223 (D. Md.), afj'd, 185 F.2d 672 
(4th Cir. 1950); Radio Patents Corp. v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 753, 169 F. Supp. 489 
(1959); Trusty v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 192, 132 F. Supp. 340 (1955), cert. denied, 350 
U.S. 975 (1956). 
o See, e.g., Spartan Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699, 705 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962); Dow Chem. Co. v. Skinner, 197 F.2d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 1952); 
Flakice Corp. v. Liquid Freeze Corp., 131 F. Supp. 599, 601 (N.D. Cal. 1955); A. L. Wallau, 
Inc. v. J. W. Landenberger 8: Co., 121 F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
10 See Philadelphia Gear Works, Inc. v. Kerotest Mfg. Co., 101 F. Supp. 820, 821 
(W.D. Pa. 1951); Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co. v. Turchan, 101 F. Supp. 621, 623 (E.D. 
Mich. 1951), afj'd, 208 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1953); Kennametal, Inc. v. American Cutting 
Alloys, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1948). 
11 See Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1950); Estate Stove 
Co. v. General Motors Corp., 79 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1948). 
12 See Kenyon, Patent Law: Why Challenge the Courts' View of "Invention"!, 35 
A.B.A.J. 480,482 (1949); Woodward, supra note 1, at 957. 
13 See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897). 
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granted.14 Thus a finding of validity at the trial stage would spare an 
appellate court wishing to reverse a finding of non-infringement the 
time and expense of remanding for determination of the validity issue.15 
Furthermore, initial adjudication of the validity issue would remove the 
need for defendants, dismissed of infringement charges, to ask for declara-
tory judgments for the purpose of refuting the judicially-reinforced pre-
sumption of patentability that exists to their disfavor.16 
Supporters of the "esprit de patentability" approach counter the above 
policy arguments by emphasizing the subtleties behind the procedure in 
a patent suit. A non-infringing defendant may often be satisfied with 
dismissal of the suit on grounds of non-infringement and will therefore 
concentrate his efforts on that issue, making only minimal preparation for 
argument as to invalidity of the patent.17 Thus certain patentees would 
be encouraged to bring infringement suits, regardless of their chances 
on the infringement question, in hope of having their dubious patents 
legally affirmed.18 Findings of validity, based on the strength of the 
patentee's evidence and subject only to token refutation by the non-
infringing defendant, would probably be rendered. These findings could 
be wielded by the patentee against prospective infringers,19 and as a 
result, technological progress might well be stifled. Moreover, if a court had 
to examine the validity issue, judicial energy would be needlessly exhausted. 
At the trial level, rulings of validity would amount to superfluous advisory 
opinions on hypothetical cases since alternative grounds of non-infringement 
could adequately dispose of the case. Also, the appellate courts would gain 
little, if any, benefit from the examination of the validity issue. Appellate 
courts seldom reverse non-infringement judgments and, when they do, a re-
mand is necessary only in cases involving conflicting oral testimony.20 Since 
14 E.g., Hycon Mfg. Co. v. H. Koch &: Sons, 219 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
349 U.S. 953 (1955); Patterson v. Rota-Hangar Co., 85 F. Supp. 1019, 1020-21 (S.D. Cal. 
1949). 
15 See Helbush v. Finkle, 170 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1948); Barry v. General Tire &: 
Rubber Co., 31 F. Supp. 879, 880 (N.D. Ill. 1940), affd, 122 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1941). 
10 Sec Spartan Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699, 705 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 967 (1962). 
17 A defendant who can easily prove non-infringement will hesitate to go to the 
trouble and expense of attacking the validity of a patent. This is especially true of a de-
fendant with limited funds, since the cost of trying a patent's validity may be as much as 
SI00,000. See Wabash Corp. v. Ross Elec. Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 590 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951); Woodward, supra note 
1, at 953. 
18 See Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1942). 
10 Since a finding of validity is superfluous to a decision of non-infringement, it would 
not become res judicata to the detriment of either the dismissed defendant or persons 
unconnected with the suit. However, such a finding would undoubtedly discourage both 
parties from bringing subsequent suits to contest the validity of the patent. See "Wabash 
Corp. v. Ross Elec. Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 589 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951); 
Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1942); Scott, Collateral 
Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 12-13 (1942). 
20 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-96 (1948); Dollar 
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patent evidence consists largely of physical exhibits, documentary evidence 
is often decisive of the issues.21 Thus findings of validity do not invariably 
aid the appellate courts. 
Proponents of the discretionary approach find theoretical support in 
the language of Sinclair.22 As one court has observed, "The Supreme Court 
employed the significant word 'usually,' thus indicating that a ruling upon 
validity is not essential in all cases involving both infringement and valid-
ity."23 Practically, the discretionary• view avoids a procedural strait jacket by 
examining validity when it is convenient under the circumstances.24 This 
approach enables the courts to fluctuate between the competing policies of 
the extremists' views in deciding whether to determine the validity of a 
patent in a given case. 
Pragmatically, it has been easier to adopt the peremptory directive 
view of the "better practice" in the cases requiring a detailed analysis 
into the infringement issue.25 The court, by first examining the validity 
of a patent, simultaneously gathers information as to its infringement.26 
However, in cases of clear non-infringement the courts have favored the 
"esprit de patentability" approach, since the task of investigating the 
validity issue is more inconvenient under those circumstances. Courts 
following the discretionary view have been able to apply it with compara-
tive ease to either factual situation by exercising discretion; they have 
favored examination of validity in difficult cases of infringement but have 
v. Land, 184 F.2d 245, 248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d 
Cir. 1950). 
21 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., supra note 20, at 395; Smith 
v. Hall, 301 U.S. 216, 228 (1937). In both cases the documentary evidence offered proved 
decisive of the validity question. 
22 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945); see Sparton Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699, 705 
(6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962). 
23 Dow Chem. Co. v. Skinner, 197 F.2d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 1952). 
24 Factors influencing the court to examine the validity of a patent are: apparent 
invalidity (scarecrows), intensity of public interest in the patent, and the interjection of 
the validity question by the complaint, e.g., an alleged infringer asking for a declaratory 
judgment on the validity of the patent. If non-infringement is clear or validity conceded 
by the defendant, however, jurisdictions following the discretionary interpretation usually 
refuse to examine validity. Compare Hall v. Wright, 125 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D. Cal. 1954), 
afj'd, 240 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1957), and Van Der Horst Corp. of America v. Chromium 
Corp. of America, 98 F. Supp. 412, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afj'd, 197 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1952), 
and Eaton Mfg. Co. v. Sibley, 60 F. Supp. 801, 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945), with Specialty Equip. 
&: Mach. Corp. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 193 F.2d 515, 520 (4th Cir. 1952), and Kennametal, 
Inc. v. American Cutting Alloys, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1948). 
25 For purposes of this discussion, the factual situations of infringement suits may 
be categorized as those in which the issue of infringement is questionable, and those in 
which non-infringement is clear. Compare Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Brewster Finish• 
ing Co., 113 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 677 (3d Cir. 1954), with Kennametal, 
Inc. v. American Cutting Alloys, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1948). 
26 Sec Specialty Equip.&: Mach. Corp. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 193 F.2d 515, 519-20 (4th 
Cir. 1952). 
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found such a procedure inconvenient in situations of clear non-infringe-
ment.27 
The spectrum of approaches to the validity issue intensifies the need 
for unifying infringement procedure. Any future attempt to accomplish 
this should be based on the principle emerging from the cases examined: 
a patentee must not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of an invalid patent 
to the detriment of potential innovators and the general public. Because of 
their apparent defects, the prevailing procedural approaches fall short 
of this goal. Peremptory direction may lead to judicial pronouncements 
of validity based on the evidence of a patentee; "esprit de patentability" 
often allows invalid patents to stand; and the discretionary view may fall 
prey to the weaknesses inherent in either of the existing alternatives. This 
reinforces the soundness of Judge Frank's view that in cases of non-
infringement the court should always examine whether a patent is 
invalid but should never pronounce a patent valid.28 This procedure 
would have the advantages of ferreting out invalid patents while leaving 
the others clothed, at worst, in a presumption rather than a judicial 
finding of validity. Adoption of this procedure should discourage litigation 
of dubious patents and eliminate superfluous findings of validity. 
Walter A. Urick 
21 Compare A. L. Wallau, Inc. v. J. W. Landenberger &: Co., 121 F. Supp. 555, 559 
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), with Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co. v. Turchan, 101 F. Supp. 621, 623 
(E.D. Mich. 1951), afj'd, 208 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1953). 
28 See Wabash Corp. v. Ross Elec. Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 
U.S. 820 (1951). 
